Me gnow k now hey now hey now when we come home
Meno DissectedConversations
Arithmetic
Set Theory
Virtue
Lines of color
Slave
Individual
Form
Figure
Angle
All things have a common notion {Figure: {Round Straight}}
Simile with multi
{ Color: {ROYGBρουγβרםטעצ}}
{ Quantity: {more, less}} All things that have a beginning have an end...Each of these topics—the Socratic defintion for definitions:
Socratic cross-examination (elenchus)
Socratic puzzlement (aporia)
Socratic doctrine of recollection aka Response Quezzy:
How knowledge comes to One
How knowledge is soul
How knowledge is the immortality of the soul
How the f mathematics is a model of knowledge
use the method of {hypothesis/idea deduce/@nalysis}π∆¶ {induce\nonce tautology\answer} aka evaluate true where attainable data allows elucidation
virtue's relationship to knowledge as knowledge when virtue is inanimate
the diagonals linking knowledge belief angularly with nonce anchoring the truth at theta in the length of the bar which is the line length defined by the
Coming into being of theta which is the drawing of line segment lefty the lucky line edged at the nonce nostril by the nose of theta none other than the roan runner Rho the line so fine it Rhos it's own boat out of the bay of Rhodium
Reasoning from particular to the general is reorganizing the ideas and the words used in any subset of the set of conversations where converse is a subset of sets where dialogue is offered for negative cost entertainment...along the lines of concepts the subset of similar things rather than the poetic or rhapsodic aka rap music where rhyme is the primary connector of words which in the common way of speaking or the discourse in the group talk sometimes called language is always used in lingo where the cats meow the same tune and know when this is this and that is that read my meaning color is an effluence of form commensurate with sight and palpable to sense that my dear Meno is...there is an orchestra who play without music written only heard aka the big bank
Soc-rates Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.
MenU There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man-he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.
SocRates How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?
Me I Know I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
SocRates And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;-would you be able to answer?
Men I Know I should.
SocRates And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, "What is virtue?" would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
Men. Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
Soc. No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered "roundness," he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is "figure" or "a figure"; and you would answer "a figure."
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And for this reason-that there are other figures?
Men. Yes.
Soc. No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered "roundness," he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is "figure" or "a figure"; and you would answer "a figure."
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And for this reason-that there are other figures?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him.
Men. I should.
Soc. And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well.
Men. I should.
Soc. And if he had said, Tell me what they are?-you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.
Men. Yes.
Soc. And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure-which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other-that would be your mode of speaking?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
Men. Certainly not.
Soc. You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?
Men. Very true.
Soc. To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the "simile in multis"? And then he might put the question in another form: Mono, he might say, what is that "simile in multis" which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.
Men. I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.
Soc. Shall I indulge you?
Men. By all means.
Soc. And then you will tell me about virtue?
Men. I will.
Soc. Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
Men. Certainly. My dear boy certainly...
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